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Abstract 
The failure of regional development is a well documented fact in explaining the 
persistence of disparities in the Italian regions. In spite of the length of public 
(ordinary and extraordinary) intervention, the Mezzogiorno is still lagging behind. 
Moreover, the priority in the European regional planning for the period 2000-
2006 is still to fill the gap in terms of infrastructures and human capital. In this 
context, the present work is aimed to provide a useful empirical background for 
the evaluation of old and new development policies.  
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1. Introduction 
The failure of regional development is a well documented fact in 
explaining the persistence of disparities in the Italian regions. In 
spite of the length of public (ordinary and extraordinary) 
intervention and the huge amount of resources involved, the 
Mezzogiorno is still lagging behind.  
 
Apparently, the changes introduced by the European regional 
planning for the period 2000-2006 do not affect the general 
structure of the European regional policies: the priority is still to 
fill the gap in terms of (economic and social) infrastructures and 
human capital in Objective 1 regions1. On the contrary, the new 
development strategy implied by the CSF 2000-2006 presents 
important differences with respect to the past experience. After a 
period of regional policies centred on the compensation of the 
competitive disadvantages of the Southern regions (mainly by 
means of centrally administrated incentives to the private sector), 
European regional policy explicitly adheres to a market logic in 
order to increase the territorial competitiveness in all depressed areas. 
 
The present work is aimed to provide an overview of the existing 
empirical studies carried out on Italian Mezzogiorno.  Following the 
intervention lines defined in the CSF 2000-6, the paper will focus 
on the role of Incentives, Infrastructures and Human Capital2: in 
this respect, it aims to offer an useful empirical background for the 
evaluation of old and new development policies.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2-3 we review some 
of the empirical studies carried out on the role of old and new 
                                                 
1 See Naldini (1999) among others. 
2 The present work contains a selection taken from a more comprehensive 
review drawn during the first phase of a project designed to carry out a 
quantitative mid-term evaluation of CSF 2000-2006 for the Mezzogiorno by using 
a macro-sectoral HERMIN model.  
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industrialisation policy in the Mezzogiorno. In particular, in section 
2, firstly, we will compare rationale and effects of financial 
incentives schemes which characterise extraordinary intervention 
and the new planning policy for the Southern regions. Secondly, 
we briefly present some empirical evidence of some specific 
instruments of negotiation planning, that is: (i) Territorial Pacts, (ii) 
Planning Contracts, (iii) Area Contracts. Some empirical 
contributes on the role of Investment in Infrastructures are 
summarised in section 3. In section 4, we focus on empirical 
analyses exploring the differentials in Human Capital between 
North and South. Particular emphasis is given to those economic, 
social and cultural factors so often called to explain human capital 
accumulation and allocation in the Southern regions. Some 
concluding remarks are in Section 5. 
2. Incentives and Industrialisation Policy in the Mezzogiorno 
2.1 From “extraordinary” to “ordinary” Intervention: the 
industrialisation policy for the Mezzogiorno before 1992  
The regulation in favour of industrialisation in the Mezzogiorno 
starts in 19573. The distinguishing aspect of this policy is an 
intervention model built on a centralising approach (both in 
infrastructure investment and incentives to firms). Since the 
beginning, financial incentives for industrial investment4 became 
one of the main instruments used to promote and develop a 
modern industrial sector in the Southern regions5; this policy’s aim 
                                                 
3 On the extraordinary intervention policy in the Mezzogiorno see Graziani (1978), 
Faini (1983), D’Antone (1996), Barca and Trento (1997), Saraceno (1983), Bodo 
and Viesti (1997), among others. 
4 On rationale and aspects of financial incentives during the extraordinary 
intervention, see Moro (1989), Siracusano and Tresoldi (1990), among others. 
5 During the extraordinary intervention, financial incentives took the form of: (i) 
Capital contribution: unsecured fund contribution calculated according to the 
amount of the expected productive investment; (ii) Interest contribution: 
representing a sort of discount for the firms calculated as a difference between 
the market interest rate and the facility on loan. In the presence of imperfect 
 4
was to determine such an amount of investment so as to 
encourage a strong capital accumulation. In a second phase, the 
progress of industrialisation should have fostered the endogenous 
growth of private investment. The relevant phases of this 
intervention policy in the Mezzogiorno can be summarised as 
follows.  
 
In 1968 the financial incentives are strengthened by the 
introduction of partial exemption of welfare contributions 
(defiscalizzazione degli oneri sociali) in favour of firms located in 
Southern regions. This measure aims to mitigate the effects of the 
abolition of the so called “gabbie salariali” and to guarantee a labour 
cost advantage for plants located in the Mezzogiorno. In 1969, 
increasing fiscal and financial incentives stimulate a massive wave 
of private and public investment. This success triggers a chain 
reaction: the more Northern plants decide to locate in the 
Southern regions, the more the fiscal and financial incentives 
increase. The oil crisis deeply hits high energy intensive sectors 
which are mostly concentrated in the Southern regions: the 
subsequent fall of investment affects the whole of the Mezzogiorno. 
After the oil crisis Government priorities changed: the volume of 
financial incentives in favour of North-Centre is bigger than 
Southern one. In general, the percentage of financial incentives in 
favour of Southern industrialisation decreases steadily after 1974; 
the chain reaction works in the reverse direction now: the more 
plants decide to locate in the Northern regions, the less are the 
financial incentives to support location in the South6. In order to 
reduce the subsequent unemployment in the Mezzogiorno, the total 
exemption of welfare contributions for Southern firms passes in 
                                                                                                         
financial markets -as in the Mezzogiorno - this instrument aims not only to boost 
investment but also to facilitate access to grants. See Malfatti (1981) among 
others.  
6 On the performance of financial incentives during eighties see Servidio (1992) 
among others. 
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19767. Since then, the total amount of public spending in 
incentives has been increasing over the period 1976-90.  
 
An empirical evaluation of the intensity of policies carried out in 
favour of the Mezzogiorno over the period 1957-93 is provided by 
Del Monte and Giannola (1997) which use some indices calculated 
by relating the amount of investment in public works, public 
consumption and State-owned firms (henceforth PPSS) for the 
Mezzogiorno to the total for Italy. If the aggregate index show a 
constant trend over the period, with a maximum in 1969-73 and a 
minimum in 1989-91,  from the more desaggregated analysis some 
important differences emerge: while the percentage of Public 
Consumption is steadily increasing over time, the percentage of 
investment in public works and PPSS, after a peak in 1969-73, 
decreases over the period 1973-93. This result is confirmed also by 
Malfatti (1994) who studies the impact of public spending in 
favour of industrial activities in the Southern regions over several 
sub-periods (from 1968 to 1992): the industrialisation policy in the 
Mezzogiorno slackens after 1976. 
 
These facts confirm the existence of two phases in policy 
development (already identified in previous analysis, such as 
Giannola (1990) and Graziani (1987)): while public resources have 
been used to increase the production in the Mezzogiorno over the 
first period, they are devoted to support household income (also 
through the exemption of welfare contributions) over the last 
period. In support of this hypothesis, Wolleb and Wolleb (1990) 
show that (i) the importance of net transfers is increasing during 
                                                 
7 In order to compare the dynamic of incentives to investment between South 
and North after 1976, Del Monte and Giannola (1997) define some indices 
related with the intensity of this policy. Their results confirm the above 
conclusions: while the incentives to investment have been successful in the 
North Centre industrialisation, in the South the component of exemption of 
welfare contributions has been largely used as an instrument for unemployment 
reduction. 
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the 70s and 80s with respect to the 60s, (ii) the relation between 
social services (prestazioni sociali) and social contributions (contributi) 
is increasing in the South and (iii) the resources devoted to 
exemption of welfare contributions become - after 1976 - the 
dynamic component of the transfers to the firms. 
2.1.1 Industrial incentives over period 1951-92: an empirical 
evaluation 
In the following sections we try to summarise some of the relevant 
results reported by empirical works which focus on the effects of 
industrial incentives on: (i) Industrial investment in the Mezzogiorno, 
(ii) Employment levels and added value, (iii) Per capita GDP 
growth rate. Particular attention will be given to some technical 
aspects related with this empirical literature. In general, we can 
roughly distinguish two different approaches used to estimate the 
effects of regional policy:  
 
1. The traditional approach, based on regression methods, 
permits one to single out a functional relationship between 
the dependent variable (that is, the objective of the 
regional policy) and a series of independent variables 
(proxies for the intensity of the regional policy)8.  
2. An alternative approach (inspired by Moore and Rhodes, 
1973) is based on the estimate of the theoretical dynamics 
of the variable of interest (employment, investment, new 
firms location) by assuming no intervention policy. The 
difference between the theoretical value and the actual one 
measures the effects of the policy adopted. The main 
drawback of this approach is to find an adequate/correct 
estimate for the theoretical behaviour of the object 
variable9.  
 
                                                 
8 See Kim (1978), Faini (1982) among others. 
9 See Del Monte and Vittoria (1993) among others. 
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(i) Effects of Industrial Incentives on Industrial Investment in the 
Mezzogiorno  
 
The real effectiveness of these industrial incentives in attracting 
such an amount of investment so as to encourage a strong capital 
accumulation in the Southern area has been object of several 
analysis and critics by the empirical literature even though the 
results are somehow mixed. Kim (1978) highlights the role played 
by incentives to industrial investment in reducing the profitability 
differentials between investment in South and North Centre. He 
also finds that the capital stock is statistically significant in 
determining the investment flows. On the contrary, in other 
similar studies – for instance, in Faini (1982) among others – the 
incentives do not seem to have a significant effect on investment 
in the Mezzogiorno. 
 
(ii) Effects of Industrial Incentives on employment level and Added Value 
 
A second stream of recent empirical literature has dealt with the 
impact of industrialisation policy on employment level. Following 
the approach proposed by Moore and Rhodes (1973), Del Monte 
A. – Giannola (1997) 10 calculate the annual rate of change (with 
reference to 1970) for employment in manufacturing 
(desaggregated into all the sectoral sub-components) at the 
national level. This rate is then employed to calculate the 
“theoretical values” of employment in the South, which give the 
level of employment that would have occurred in the South – 
assuming no regional policy – if the change in employment rate 
were the same as in Italy. The difference between the theoretical 
and the actual value of employment in manufacturing (henceforth 
DELTA) is then used to evaluate the effects of regional policy on 
employment over the period 1951-1987. As regards the results: (i) 
DELTA exhibits an unexpected positive trend during the 50s 
(period characterised by absence of regional policy); as a possible 
                                                 
10 On the effects of industrial incentives see also Cardone and Vinci (1990). 
 8
explanation the authors argue that traditional industry 
(characterised by high labour intensity) is expanding in the 
Southern regions in these years; (ii) since 1958, during the 
integration process between the Southern market(s) and national 
market, the crisis of the traditional industry implies huge 
reductions in employment (the regional policy is still too weak to 
compensate for this structural transformation); (iii) in the period 
1970–90, the effects of the industrialisation policy on employment 
become much more evident (even if delayed). But during the 80s a 
turnabout is observed: even if the industrialisation policy is still 
relevant, the employment decreases.  
 
In order to evaluate the impact of the industrialisation policy on 
the Added value, Del Monte and Giannola (1997) repeat the same 
analysis with reference to the added value. According to their 
results, the difference between real and theoretical value 
(DELVAG) calculated for added value exhibits: (i) a negative trend 
during the period 1951-62 (consistent with the absence of policy); 
(ii) a positive trend during the period 1962-80 (with the exception 
for the period 1967-72), related to the growth in investment; (iii) a 
negative trend since 1980: this is partly due to the slowing down of 
high capital intensive investments; (iv) finally, after the 1980s, even 
if the intensity of industrialisation policy is still relevant, its 
effectiveness is decreasing: it does not seem to have a positive 
effect neither on manufacturing employment nor on added value.   
 
This “loss of effectiveness” of the industrialisation policy is also 
evident with regard to the cost of creating an additional job. By 
using a mixed approach of shift-share and regression analysis, Del 
Monte and Vittoria (1993) calculate the additional employment 
created by the industrialisation policy, in the manufacturing sector 
in the Mezzogiorno, over the period 1964-84. According to an index 
calculated by dividing the total amount of incentives by the 
increase of additional jobs, they argue that, it turned out to be 
much more expensive to create new employment during the 
period 1974-84 than previously. This result has been confirmed in 
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a study carried out by Cambridge Economic Consultants (1991): 
the Italian Southern regions have received the highest level of 
support (especially if compared with Northern Ireland and 
Portugal) and present the highest cost of creating additional jobs. 
As a possible explanation for this “loss of effectiveness” it has 
been argued that incentives in the form of exemption from welfare 
contribution tend to favour not additional projects, but projects 
that would have been realised in any case. The “loss of 
effectiveness” of the industrialisation policy is thus mainly due to 
“inefficiency” in the policy instruments.  
 
Several studies have explored the possible causes of this “loss of 
effectiveness” of the industrialisation policy. Some relevant factors 
have been singled out: (i) Structural change in the industrialisation 
process in Italy, (ii) Incentives become more relevant in the north 
Centre, (iii) Increasing rigidities in the labour market (Bodo and 
Sesitito, 1990), (iv) features of the transfer policies. By using the 
regression method, Del Monte and Giannola (1997) test the 
relevance of all these factors in explaining the “loss of 
effectiveness” over the period 1960-90. The dependent variables 
are the same variables as defined above: the difference between 
actual and theoretical value with reference to employment and 
added value in manufacturing. These variables are regressed on: (i) 
an index of the incentives for investment in the Mezzogiorno, (ii) the 
ratio between incentives in North and South, (iii) a time trend to 
take into account several structural factors, (iv) the ratio between 
income by industrial subordinate employment (reddito da lavoro 
dipendente nell’industria) in the North and in the South as a proxy for 
the existing rigidities in the Mezzogiorno labour market, (v) the value 
of incentives given by the exemption from welfare contributions, 
(vi) a dummy variable for the period subsequent to 1975 to take 
into account the role of any structural change in the Italian 
industrialisation process. They obtain the following results: (i) no 
long run functional relation between the dependent variable 
calculated for employment (the difference between the actual and 
theoretical value) in manufacturing and the absolute value of 
 10
regional policy has been detected; only short run effects exist; (ii) 
the structural trend has the negative and significant expected sign: 
in spite of the incentives policy, adverse structural factors seem to 
be relevant over the period considered. 
 
(iii) Effects of Industrial Incentives on per capita GDP growth rate  
 
An other important aspect concerns the role of the regional policy 
in enhancing regional growth. Among others, Paci and Pusceddu 
(1994) use a panel data approach to estimate whether  the growth 
rate of per capita income observed during the period 1970–1991 
for the Southern regions is explained by (i) the financial incentives, 
(ii) the public consumption, (iii) the capital accumulation process, 
(iv) a measure of the industrialisation process. The results confirm 
the positive role played by the public intervention on growth and 
the importance of the industrialisation process.  
2.2 From centralisation to local development: the new 
intervention policy in favour of “depressed” areas 
During the 1980s the national intervention policy in the 
Mezzogiorno was driven by specific situations of crises. In the 
absence of a planning phase, these “extraordinary” intervention 
policies largely implied enormous waste of resources. Since the 
1990s, the policies for the Southern regions have been overhauled: 
not only were the “extraordinary intervention” policies repealed 
but also the idea of a “top-down” policy has been replaced with a 
policy based on the participation of local communities in the 
process of allocation of available resources at the local level11.  
 
Some important elements contribute to explain this change in 
strategy: (i) The traditional intervention policies in favour of the 
Mezzogiorno, based on financial incentive to investment, largely 
failed; (ii) The Treaty of Maastricht not only introduced and 
                                                 
11 See Aquino (1999), Barca (2000), Del Monte (1998), Giannola (2000), 
Graziani (1997),Triglia (1999), Acconcia and Del Monte (2000a), among others.  
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transferred to European Union many tasks linked to the industrial 
policy sector but also provided important limits to the granting of 
financial incentives. The larger power conferred to European 
Union was aimed on the one hand to create some common rules 
in the unique market, on the other hand to realise some 
intervention on the optimum scale.   
 
Within this new approach and in line with the EU regional 
policies, the intervention policy explicitly aims to favour not only 
the Southern regions but all depressed areas of the country. The new 
strategy for enhancing industrial and social development in the 
Southern area is articulated according to four intervention lines: (i) 
the reduction of barriers to capital, labour and firms mobility, (ii) 
the strengthening of communication systems across areas, (iii) to 
foster agglomeration for the production of positive externalities 
among firms, (iii) to make all available mobile, immobile, natural, 
human resources in the area accessible.    
 
According to the intervention lines for the development defined 
above, the instruments describing the new development policy for 
the Mezzogiorno can be grouped into three main categories: 
 
(i) incentives to investment  
(ii) intervention for the local productive systems 
development regulated under the negotiation planning 
(iii) public investments 
 
In the following sections we try to summarise some relevant 
empirical contributions which enliven the actual debate on current 
policy. Due to insufficient data available, we are forced to narrow 
the analysis to some of the instruments provided by the new 
development policy (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed 
exposition)12.  
                                                 
12 On the methodologies adopted in evaluating Industrial policies, see Brancati 
(2001). 
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2.2.1 The new financial incentives scheme for depressed 
areas: Law 488/92 
Law 488/92 - come in force in 1996  - represents the principal 
instrument to promote private accumulation within the new 
regulation for less developed  areas.  
 
The 488/92 decrees the abandon of the automatic system of 
facilities grant provided by Law 64/86: the old regulation has been 
replaced with a mechanism based on resources rationing and a 
selection procedure. As the debate on regional policies has strongly 
emphasised, a relevant problem in the implementation of 
development policies concerns the rents connected to the 
distribution of subsidies to investment. Law 488/1992 tries to 
solve this problem by adopting a mechanism of allocation based 
on 3 indicators: (i) the share of owners’ founds on total 
investment, (ii) the new job creation by unit of investment, (iii) the 
cut on the maximum possible capital aid accepted by the firms. 
Scalera and Zazzaro (2000) argue that, if this auction mechanism is 
able to limit the phenomena of rent seeking, it does not seem all 
the same able to guarantee the impact maximisation of the 
development policy. This because: (i) the adoption of a 
multidimensional bid makes difficult to study the properties in 
terms of efficient selection of investments to be financed, (ii) some 
of the variable entering the multidimensional bid seem not to be 
consistent with the development of subsidised areas.  
 
In order to investigate if this procedure, reducing the amount of 
incentive by units of investment, is nevertheless efficient in 
financing additional private capital formation and employment, 
Pellegrini and Carlucci (2003) try to estimate if employment 
creation in subsidised firms is additional compared to the non 
subsidised ones. Their results show a positive, statistically 
significant and robust impact of the incentive by 488/92 on 
 13
employment: the subsidised firms present a employment dynamics 
from 3 to 15% points higher than in non subsidised ones13. 
 
As above mentioned, Law 488/92 promotes investment carried 
out by firms located in all depressed areas. Many authors have 
strongly emphasised how this enlarged territorial competence 
could generate a waste of resources, by underestimating the 
emergency for important location diseconomies in the Southern 
regions (Servidio, 1997).  
2.2.2 Intervention policies for the local productive systems 
development: The negotiation planning14  
The new intervention policy explicitly provides for incentives 
mechanisms aimed to favour the development of efficient local 
institutions15 (see Tab. 1 for a summary of rationale and aspects 
related to the negotiation planning). The strategy pursued by the 
negotiation planning aims to duplicate in the South the high 
territorial specialisation experienced with success in many 
Northern areas. According to this strategy, the public intervention 
is subordinated to the commitment by various actors (firms, trade 
unions, territorial units) to develop - in a Southern area – network 
relationships similar to those of the industrial districts16. The 
innovative element of the Negotiation Planning consists in the 
explicit purpose of remove one of the main obstacles to the 
Southern development: the lack of co-operative mentality.  One 
hand, this prevents small and medium enterprises to form a 
consortium to realise important scale economies, on the other 
                                                 
13 On the effectiveness of incentives provided by Law 488/92 see also Cafiero 
(1998) among others. 
14 See Gallia (1997). 
15 In line with this strategy, the resources allocation for period 1998-2001 awards 
a growing weight to specific instruments of negotiation planning. 
16 See Bobbio (2000) for a detailed analysis of the actual negotiation process in 
public choices in Italy. 
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hand, the lack of co-operative spirit contributes to the inefficiency 
of public institution in the South.   
 
In the following sections we briefly present some empirical 
evidence of specific instruments of negotiation planning, that is: (i) 
Territorial Pacts, (ii) Planning Contracts, (iii) Area Contract.  
 
(i) Territorial Pacts (Patti Territoriali) 
 
The Territorial Pact is an instrument for the local development - 
operating since 1998 – which integrates: (i) incentives to 
compensate territorial disadvantages in localisation of new plants, 
(ii) interventions (social and economic infrastructures) to 
structurally overcome these advantages. 
   
On the whole, 220 National and 10 European Territorial Pacts 
have been approved since 1997. The percentage of population and 
territory interested by this instrument signals a positive bias in 
favour of the Southern regions (80% against 30% in the Centre-
North) (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2003).   
  
During the past five years Territorial Pacts have been object of 
several analysis and critics. Unfortunately, the empirical 
contributes are limited by the poor availability of data. Among the 
few existing contributes, the analysis promoted by the Ministry for 
the Development and Cohesion Policies (2003) tries to outline an 
evaluation of the performance of Territorial Pacts according to 
their: (i) Financial efficiency and (ii) effectiveness. Their results can 
be summarised as follows. Available data on financial efficiency 
parameters – which measures the minimum requirements for this 
instrument being successful -  show that the percentage of 
industrial initiatives which received grants reveals a strong 
variability among Pacts: on the one hand we observe a relevant 
progress for some Pacts,  on the other hand we register important 
delays even in regards to “mature” Pacts. The number of initiatives 
not covered by grants or with grants below the 30% of the total is 
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still relevant. Besides, the speed in spending public funds 
remarkably varies: below 20% for national “mature” Pacts, above 
30% for European Pacts. Unfortunately, no data on the effects of 
Territorial Pacts on employment and information about the 
number of settled initiatives are currently available. 
 
As regards their preliminary results on the effectiveness,  for most 
of the existing Pacts is too early to attempt an evaluation of their 
performance. The analysis is thus limited to Pacts which have been 
operative for 3 years at least, characterised by substantial financial 
efficiency. This sample includes 19 Pacts: 5 activated in the Centre 
North and 14 in the Mezzogiorno. The objective is to evaluate (i) if 
and in what measure these Pacts have been effective, (ii) which 
territorial institutional and sectoral features recur in the effective 
Pacts. The main results of the analysis are somewhat mixed. On 
average, interventions in Infrastructures take up 18% of total 
public resources. Up to 42% of interventions concerns the 
enhancing of value of territorial resources. 22% the mobility. Up 
to 64% of Infrastructural interventions results integrated with 
private investment. As regards the potential to improve the local 
context, they register a notable variability in the performance 
exhibited by these 19 Pacts. Technical assistance, which is an 
important component of the activity provided by Pacts, results 
positively correlated with a powerful political leadership. Finally,  
the institutional solutions promoted by Pacts vary notable: no 
correlation seems to emerge between the institutional solution 
experimented within a Pact and the performance exhibited.  
 
Other relevant empirical studies have been carried out on  
narrower samples17. By analysing the sectoral composition and 
specialisation of one third of approved territorial pacts for the 
Mezzogiorno, Lodde (2002) reports some important (although 
preliminary) results:  due to an inadequate planning (“concertazione”) 
between local authority and Local Productive System (henceforth 
                                                 
17 See Riccone (2002) for a comparison carried out on three Territorial Pacts. 
 16
LPS), the initiatives linked with territorial pacts reflect more the 
territorial structure of local authority and its political relationship 
than the network externalities, interdependence and the labour 
mobility expressed by LPS18. Moreover, the participation by 
manufacturing districts allocated in the Mezzogiorno appears to be 
“fortuitous”: manufacturing districts are included in the pacts just 
because pacts cover most of the Southern areas. Finally, Local 
Productive Systems seem unable to influence the composition of 
investment financed within the pact.  
 
(ii) Planning Contract (Contratti di Programma) 
 
With this instrument, State and firms draw up a contract to realise 
industrial investments together with research activities (R&D and 
training) and to create additional employment with positive and 
significant effects on both the local and the national economic 
system19. This instrument is exclusive to depressed areas.  
 
Among the few empirical studies carried out on this instrument, 
Florio and Giunta (2002) provide an evaluation of 27 in progress 
Planning Contracts stipulated between 1986 and 2000. Their 
empirical evidence suggests a progressive removal of this 
instrument from its original principles. Their results can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
(a) The object of the contract appears merely finalised to a 
capital contribution while the obligation in terms of 
employment, training and R&D, looks like a diluted 
outline agreement; 
                                                 
18 For a qualitative evaluation of the role of territorial institutions, see De Vivo 
(2000). 
19 For an ex ante evaluation of Planning Contract see Florio and Giunta (1998), 
among others. 
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(b) The planning agency has been largely substituted by the 
Industrial party in formulating the projects. No ex post 
evaluation is provided; 
(c) As regards the results, on the whole, the strategy 
behind this instrument – which originally aimed to 
strengthen high tech investment and scale economies 
in the Mezzogiorno – appears greatly scaled down. 
 
(iii) Area Contract (Contratti d’area) 
 
The Area Contract (Law 662/96) is an instrument designed for the 
implementation of new business initiatives and the development of 
new jobs in industry, services and tourism, in circumscribed areas, 
facing employment crisis. Moreover, it aims to promote 
agreements between public and private, local and external actors to 
create suitable conditions for the location of SMEs (Small and 
Medium Enterprises).  
 
An evaluation of the effectiveness of this instrument in attracting 
foreign investment and enhancing specific competitive 
potentialities of Southern area is given in Bianchi and Mariotti 
(2002). Their analysis is carried out on information gathered by (i) 
questionnaires compiled by firms which have transferred their 
productive activity from the Centre-North to the Southern area 
(Crotone, Manfredonia, Ottana) and by (ii) interviews to actors 
involved in this relocation process. The results are then compared 
with information gathered by a survey on firms which have located 
their productive investment in South Eastern European Countries 
(henceforth SEEC). This comparison allows to test if the two 
systems compete in the attraction of relocating Italian SMEs. Most 
recent studies show that the SEEC attract a larger number of 
business investments from Northern Italian regions than the 
Mezzogiorno. The results reported by Bianchi and Mariotti (2002) 
show that, in spite of this quantitative evidence these two systems 
are not in competition. SMEs belonging to north-eastern industrial 
districts and operating in clothing, textile and engineering industry, 
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tend to relocate low-value added, labour-intensive activities in 
those countries (the SEEC) where they can find lower labour and 
production costs. Centre-northern small firms, operating in 
various manufacturing sectors and not belonging to industrial 
districts, prefer to relocate medium-high added value activities to 
the Southern areas (where Area Contract is operative). While the 
first group mainly adopts industrial and commercial subcontracting 
relationships, the second tends to make capital-intensive 
investments by using the Government subsidies. They open new 
branches or new firms in which the whole production process or a 
new production line is transferred.  
2.2.3 Negotiation Planning: some preliminary conclusions 
Though it is too early to attempt a comprehensive empirical 
evaluation of these new policies effects, the preliminary empirical 
results are somewhat mixed. 
 
As regards Territorial Pacts, this instrument does not provide 
unambiguous results of success or failure. Some pacts are effective 
while other are not able to take off: it is important to note that an 
high percentage of failure of this instrument would result particular 
worrying given the high percentage of Pacts approved in the 
Mezzogiorno (70%).  
 
The empirical evidence in favour of Area Contract has shown that 
the Mezzogiorno system needs to become much more qualified in 
order to attract a larger amount of high added value investment, 
national as well as foreign, and regional policy can play a crucial 
role in this scenario (Bianchi, Mariotti, 2002). The analysis of in 
progress planning contracts carried out by Florio and Giunta (2002) 
highlights that this instrument fails to spur high technology 
investments in the Mezzogiorno, and it limits to stimulate such 
production as agriculture, light industry and tourism. 
Finally, due to the scarce differentiation among Negotiation 
Planning instruments and incentive regulation, the risk of 
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“resources cannibalisation” among alternative instruments looks 
almost inevitable (Cersosimo and Wolleb, 2001).  
  
On the whole, the empirical evidence, even if insufficient, does not 
seem to provide any confirmation that the new negotiation 
planning instruments are suitable to enhance the co-operative 
spirit, as declared in the CSF strategy. Due to the high number of 
involved actors, the complexity of the pursued strategy clashes 
with the inefficiency of the local government in the South (see 
Servidio, 1997, among others). It is thus crucial to afford and 
explore this apparent failure in order to transform the 
development policy in an instrument able to “launch believable 
prophecies” (Ciampi, 1998).  
3. The role of Infrastructures in the Mezzogiorno  
Investment in Infrastructure has always been a mainstay of 
development and regional policies. An adequate endowment of 
infrastructures enhances the productivity of capital and labour, 
which, in turn, tend to locate where an high quality level of 
infrastructure is situated. In order to set this virtuous circle going, 
the extraordinary intervention policy in the Mezzogiorno has started 
as public investment policy to fill the gap between North and 
South of the country in terms of infrastructures. The results of this 
policy have largely failed to meet the expectations. In spite of the 
vast amount of resources involved, the insufficient infrastructure 
endowment in the Mezzogiorno is still an important item on the 
agenda. In what follows, we try to review some relevant empirical 
contributes which may provide useful elements on (i) the extent of 
the gap between North and South in terms of infrastructures, and 
(ii) the effects of this policy on productivity in the Southern area. 
We then present some empirical works which explicitly test the 
relevance of some factors so often called to explain the failure of 
the Infrastructures policy in the Mezzogiorno. At the end of this 
section, we will briefly comment some innovative aspects of the 
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policy for Infrastructure implied in the New Planning for the 
depressed areas.  
3.1 The role of Infrastructures: brief survey of recent 
empirical studies 
The theory of “regional development potential” maintains that, the 
growth of a region depends on the available stock of public 
infrastructure in the region. The source of economic dualism 
between the Centre-North and the South can be thus partly 
explained by differences in the stock of infrastructures, or more 
generally, by differences in the “environment conditions”. The 
existing empirical literature on infrastructure can be grouped into 
several methodological strands20: 
 
1. studies on the efficient level of infrastructure endowment  
2. studies relating public capital accumulation to the growth rate 
of TFP (total factor productivity), computed as a residual from 
growth accounting 
3. studies in which public capital has been included as an input in 
the production function, and its marginal returns have been 
estimated 
4. studies where the contribution of infrastructure investment to 
reducing production costs has been assessed 
5. studies on the role of differences in the infrastructures 
endowment in explaining (the absence of) regional 
convergence  
 
As we will see, the empirical results differ not only across 
methodologies, but also within the same approach. In the 
following sections we will briefly present some interesting results21 
with particular emphasis on technical aspects.  
 
                                                 
20 See La Ferrara (1999) and La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) for a similar 
classification carried out on international  empirical literature. 
21 See tab. 1  for a summary of main technical aspects and results. 
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3.1.1 The efficient level of Infrastructure endowment 
Several studies have try to quantify the level of Infrastructure in 
the Southern regions. Brancalente and Di Palma (1982), using a 
matrix of infrastructures endowment, economic and development 
indexes, show that infrastructure endowment and level of 
development are still strongly correlated in the Mezzogiorno22. By 
comparing the endowment in terms of infrastructure among 
Italian regions during the period 1970-1991 , Lopes (1996) points 
out that, in spite of the huge amount of resources devoted to it, 
the Southern regions still present indexes of infrastructure lower 
than the national average; in more detail, his results show that, the 
Southern endowment appears particularly weak in terms of 
“economic relevant” infrastructure (such as energy and water) 
while the differences are less marked with respects to “social” 
infrastructure (such as schools and hospitals). Additionally, for 
each region, Lopes (1996) compares the variation in the 
infrastructure endowment with the variation in the public capital 
stock over the period 1970-91. The results show that while most 
of the Northern regions exhibit positive differentials between the 
increase in endowment and the increase in spending, all the 
Southern regions show negative differentials. 
 
In order to verify if the infrastructure supply has been driven by 
market forces or has been overestimated (or underestimated) with 
respects to the real demand by Italian regions, Barbieri and Causi 
(1996) carry out a multivariate analysis for the period 1987-92 
using a factorial and a cluster analysis. As a proxy for the demand 
of infrastructures, they use an index based on (i) per capita income 
level, (ii) industrialisation level, (iii) level of specialisation in service 
industries, (iv) density in the productivity use of territory, (v) credit 
supply, (vi) standard of living, among others. As a proxy for the 
supply of infrastructure they use the expenditure in public works 
                                                 
22 See also Brancalente, Di Palma, Mazziotta (1993), Di Palma, Mazziotta (1998), 
Di Palma, Mazziotta, Rosa (1999). 
 22
surveyed by ISTAT. The results show that the expenditure in 
public works has not been able to balance the regional differentials 
in infrastructure endowment. On the contrary, important factors 
of “inertia” seem to have played a role in the territorial distribution 
of the public expenditure23: the huge amount of investment in 
Infrastructure recorded since the 80s appears to be independent 
from the corresponding demand.  
 
Finally, a recent survey by ISTAT (2000) provides a measure of the 
gap between the South and the Centre North in terms of 
infrastructure endowment: from 1987 to 1997 the Southern 
infrastructure endowment reached only fifty per cent of the level 
of the rest of Italy; Moreover, the regional differences in terms of 
infrastructure are even higher than the economic differences 
between North and South. 
3.1.2 The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) approach  
This approach deals with the question whether Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) can be at least in part explained by changes in 
the pattern of infrastructure investment. Among others, Picci 
(1997, 1999) explores the effect of public capital – aggregated at a 
national level – on total factor productivity for the years 1890-
1992. All the public works related with new infrastructure, 
renovation, etc. enter in the analysis. The results show that, a 
positive and significant relation exists between labour productivity 
and public capital stock (with the only exception of period 1919–
1938).  
 
La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) apply the TFP approach to 
Italian regional data for the period 1970-94. In their results the 
overall elasticity of output with respect to public capital is positive, 
rather high (0.47) and significant at 5%, while the coefficient on 
                                                 
23 See Brosio and Piperno (1989) for an empirical analysis of the role played by 
the development policy in determining the territorial distribution of public 
spending.   
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private capital growth is negative, suggesting that the returns to 
private capital may be decreasing. By estimating the regression 
separately for the periods 1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-94 they 
observe that, the maximum impact obtains in the eighties, with a 
elasticity of TFP to Public Capital of 0.82, the lowest one in the 
seventies, with an elasticity of 0.24, while the estimated value for 
the first half of the nineties is 0.53. Finally, by desaggregating over 
macro regions, the coefficient of public capital growth is positive 
(but not significant at conventional levels) for the North West and 
the Centre, positive and significant for the South, negative and not 
significant for the North East. The estimated elasticity is 
particularly high for the South (0.62).  
3.1.3 The Production Function approach  
According to this approach, services from public capital are 
considered as a direct factor input, usually proxy by the available 
stock of infrastructure: the main question is whether the elasticity 
of output with respect to this input is positive and significant. 
Within this approach, Picci (1999), using regional data for Italy, 
reports an elasticity of production to public capital of 0.43 and 
0.35 with fixed and random effects, respectively.  
 
To evaluate the effects on private sector’s productivity of 
infrastructures provided by public sector, Lopes (1996) estimates 
the production function for the period 1970-1991. His results 
show that, infrastructure has a positive effect on industrial factors 
productivity while the effects related to current spending are not 
significant. With regard to this, the author argues that: “ even if the 
current spending increases the demand, it does not help to develop 
productivity activities, on the contrary, it damages the rising 
industry because it encourages imports from developed areas ”. 
 
La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) obtain estimated coefficient for a 
Cobb Douglas specification for Italian regions over period 1970-
94, using fixed effects and time dummies. According their results, 
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the elasticity of output with respect to public capital is negative for 
Italy, while that to private capital is positive and significant. 
Repeating the analysis over different sub-periods, the negative 
impact of public capital on output only holds for the Seventies, 
while in the Eighties and Nineties such impact is significantly 
positive and increasing (the estimated coefficient for these periods 
is, respectively, 0.17 and 0.56). Further useful information can be 
gained from regional desaggregation. It turns out that public 
capital is mostly productive in the South, followed by the Centre, 
and not productive in the North. 
 
Paci and Saddi (2002)24, using a annual panel with fixed effects 
over the period 1970-1995, estimate a production function in 
which the regional infrastructure stock enters as a measure of 
public capital. Their results can be summarised as follows: (i) the 
estimated elasticity of output with respect to aggregated public 
capital is positive and statistically significant for the whole country 
(0.16 for Italy) and also for the macro regions (0.14 for Northern 
regions and 0.20 for Southern regions), with the exception of the 
Centre25 (-0.06, not significant); (ii) the desaggregation of public 
capital into functional categories emphasises the important role 
played by infrastructure directly related to the economic 
production such as transport networks, telecommunications, 
airports: the estimated elasticity of output with respect to these 
categories is about 0.13 for Italy (0.16 for Northern and Southern 
regions and –0.22 for the Centre) followed by social infrastructure 
(0.09 for Italy, 0.17 for the North, 0.08 for the South and –0.15 for 
the Centre). On the contrary, the results report a negative and 
statistically significant elasticity of output with respect to the 
housing infrastructure (-0.05 for Italy, -0.13 for Northern and 
Southern Regions, 0.19 for the Centre). 
 
                                                 
24 Data set used in this study is presented in Paci and Pusceddu (2000). 
25 The anomalous values for the Centre are partly due to not regionalised 
spending attributed to Rome. 
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3.1.4 The Cost Function approach  
In general this kind of approach deals with the following dual 
problem: are there substantial cost savings in the presence of 
public infrastructure? 
 
La Ferrara and Marcellino (2000) estimate the total cost function 
with respect to the public capital stock for Italian regions over 
period 1970-94: a significant cost reduction seems to be related 
with public investment in the Southern regions. When they take 
into account the opportunity cost of public capital, the investment 
in infrastructure does not seem to have been efficient: the cost 
saving has not been such as to balance the social cost of the 
investment in infrastructure. Rossi and Toniolo (1993), using a 
century long dataset (1880-1980) 26, find that public and private 
capital are substitutes in the short run but become complements in 
the long run for most of the sample period. 
3.1.5 The role of infrastructure in explaining regional 
convergence 
An other stream of recent literature explicitly focuses on the role 
of differences in the regional endowment of infrastructures as a 
possible explanation for the absence of absolute convergence 
across Italian regions (Acconcia and Del Monte, 2000b, Paci and 
Pigliaru, 1995, Viviani and Vulpes, 1995, among others). All these 
empirical works use the “augmented” growth model, where 
infrastructure enters as a production factor. This empirical 
literature shows very similar and consistent results, regardless the 
different proxies used to measure infrastructures. Not only does 
the general endowment of infrastructure positively affects 
economic growth but so also do some specific infrastructure, such 
as transport and infrastructure for sanitation, energy and 
reclamation (Viviani and Vulpes, 1995).  Moreover, Sicca (1999) 
                                                 
26 See Rossi, Sorgato, Toniolo (1993) for an exhaustive presentation of the data 
set used in this study.  
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suggests that, in order to attract investment, regions need to ensure 
that, in addition to the “core” infrastructure, knowledge-based 
infrastructure (such as Universities, research activities and, more 
generally, all the agglomeration factors that might support the 
attractiveness of a certain location) be made available to the 
business community.  
3.2 Indirect effects of the policy for the Infrastructures  
On the whole, the empirical studies  find evidence in favour of the 
fact that, not only the policy for Infrastructures has been largely 
inefficient in filling the gap between North and South, but it has 
also required an higher realisation cost per unit in the Southern 
regions than in the Northern area. Besides, Southern regions offer 
several examples of infrastructures projects never completed or 
even not in public interest projects involving huge amount of 
resources (see Brosio and Piperno (1988), Del Monte (1996) 
among others). As a possible explanation of such as inefficiency, 
the literature has often emphasised the role played by corruption in 
influencing the policy for the Infrastructure in the Mezzogiorno. In 
particular, corruption could distort the composition of 
government expenditure as corrupt politicians may be expected to 
invest in large, non productive projects from which it is easier than 
in productive activities to exact large bribes. A very recent stream 
of empirical literature has explicitly tried to estimate the effect of 
corruption on the productivity of expenditure on public 
investment. Among the others, Del Monte and Papagni (1998), by 
using a dynamic panel data approach, maintain that corruption has 
strong effects on economic growth because it lowers the amount 
and quality of public infrastructure and services supplied to the 
private sector27.  
                                                 
27 See also Acconcia and Del Monte (2000b). 
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3.3 Policy for Infrastructure in the New Planning for 
depressed areas  
A recent study performed by IGI shows that, on 321 public works 
authorised in 1994, only 17 have been successfully completed 
before the end of 1998. Among the more recurring causes of delay 
in carrying out designed works, the survey singles out: (i) 
inefficient planning implying variants and consequent 
postponements (32%), dispossess due to competence overlapping 
and contentious (27%), financial problems (11%), others (30%).   
 
The new intervention policy proposes two mechanisms to 
overcome the inefficiency which characterises the planning phase 
in the Southern regions: (i) the centralised selection of proposals 
made by regions, according to a national list, (ii) the decentralised 
carrying out of works: if a region is not able to carry out the 
planning works, resources will then be assigned to the following 
project. This strategy aims to foster competition and speed up the 
decisional process, but the risk is that, if all public administrations 
are inefficient in the South, this would imply a relevant lost of 
crucial resources for the Mezzogiorno.  
4. Human capital and Southern development 
The empirical evidence has highlighted some important aspects of 
human capital in the Mezzogiorno: the population - and more 
crucially the labour supply - exhibits very low education rates if 
compared with other developed countries (Rossi, 1997). Besides, 
the low percentage of graduates shows a strong preference for 
humanistic studies: the choice for an education which does not 
favour productivity growth has been greatly driven by the 
opportunity of a public employment in the South (Paganetto and 
Scandizzo, 1996). 
 
The presentation of empirical studies is articulated as follows. In 
the first part we gather the results obtained in studies carried out 
on the role of human capital accumulation and location in 
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influencing regional productivity growth (and convergence). The 
analyses presented in the second part, in order to explain why 
human capital seems to be unable to foster growth in the South, 
try to identify specific social and economic components related 
with the human capital accumulation. 
4.1 The role of human capital in explaining Italian regional 
growth  
According to the endogenous growth theory (Lucas 1988, Romer, 
1990), human capital accumulation should lead to an augmenting 
rate of growth of production and, consequently, of the whole 
economy. Therefore, geographical areas endowed with a greater 
stock or better-qualified human capital should grow faster than 
others.  
 
Several empirical works analyse the effect of human capital – 
proxy by education - on Italian regional growth (and convergence). 
Following the general approach, the investment in human capital 
enters as an input in the GDP growth rate. The results of this 
empirical literature are quite puzzling, mainly due to the 
specification of the estimated models as well as to the different 
proxies used for human capital (main aspects and results are 
reported in table 2).  
 
If in general human capital (proxy by education level) does not 
appear to have a clear-cut role in explaining the Italian regional 
disparities, however some interesting results emerge.  
 
By decomposing total schooling into its constituent parts (primary, 
secondary and tertiary education), Di Liberto (2001) finds that only 
primary education in the South seems to contribute to growth. 
This result suggests that the Italian growth benefited from the 
elimination of illiteracy in the South, mainly in the 60’s, but not 
from the substantial increases in education at the other levels.  
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In general, controlling for the allocation effect reinforces the 
effects of education on output growth: tertiary education which 
does seem to promote growth in the aggregate becomes a 
significant growth enhancing factor if its allocation among sectors 
is taken into account (Lodde, 2000). Moreover, all the 
measurements of human capital allocated to the public sector are 
negatively related to economic growth (Di Liberto, 2001). In the 
absence of a strong industrial sector, public administration has 
absorbed an abnormally large share of highly educated labour 
force in the South.  
 
The choice of education studies strongly influences the GDP per 
capita growth. The analysis carried out by Maiolo (2001) finds 
evidence in favour of a well known aspect: the Mezzogiorno is 
characterised by a predominant investment in “not productive” 
human capital (that is, education in humanistic studies) and by a 
scarce investment in “productive” human capital (that is, technical 
and scientific studies). This “unproductive” investment – and the 
consequent waste of resources – has negatively influenced the 
Southern regional growth. This results confirm the hypothesis 
described by Paganetto e Scandizzo (1996): investment in 
humanistic studies do not contribute to develop new productive 
resources but implies just a redistribution of existing resources (rent 
seeking). 
 
Moreover, Carmeci and Mauro (2002) find that when the 
unemployment rate is included as a further explanatory variable 
the traditional human capital proxy, the high school enrolment 
rate, turns out to positively and significantly affect regional growth 
in Italy. Mauro (2002) obtain similar results using several different 
empirical approaches and time frequencies. In order to account for 
these results, Mauro (2002) proposes a growth model with an 
imperfect labour market in which the accumulation of human 
capital is the output of a learning-by-doing process where 
scholastic knowledge must be combined with working experience. 
Labour market imperfections and the resulting unemployment rate 
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lower the efficiency of the transformation of scholastic knowledge 
into productive human capital with negative implications on long 
run growth.  
 
Finally, most of the empirical studies on convergence across Italian 
regions neglect the role of human capital content of migration 
flows. In a neoclassical growth model with human capital, if the 
migrants bring some human capital, the effects on convergence 
could be different. In particular, migration flows could increase 
divergence if migrants are endowed with a level of human capital 
higher than the average level in the source regions and lower than 
the average level in the destination economy (brain drain). As 
regards Italian regions, Goria and Ichino (1994) show that, 
migration appears to favour regional convergence between 1962 
and 1975: in fact, in this period population movements seem to be 
mainly characterised by flows of unskilled labour from southern 
regions towards north-central regions. After 1975 the intensity of 
migration flows decreases and the nature of these flows changes: 
population movements are constituted by less intense flows of 
more skilled labour out of the north and towards the south. 
Descriptive evidence based on individual micro data suggests that, 
these more recent flows are largely constituted by white collar 
workers looking for public administration jobs in the southern 
bureaucracy. Consequently, these movements, far from being 
factors enhancing  productivity, may have contributed to generate 
the per capita income divergence across regions observed in Italy 
after 197528. 
4.2 Human capital in the Mezzogiorno: Social and economic 
factors 
The main empirical (and theoretical) contributes can be 
distinguished according to two different approaches. While the 
tradition approach has dealt with factors influencing the individual 
                                                 
28 See also Piras (1995). 
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choice to accumulate human capital, the more recent approach 
explicitly considers the role played by the market.  
4.2.1 Factors influencing the human capital supply 
The traditional approach focuses on the social and economic 
variables which influence the individual choice to accumulate 
human capital. The empirical evidence reported in Checchi (1997) 
29shows that the education system appears largely inefficient, 
mostly in secondary and tertiary education. Consequently, the 
familiar background plays a crucial role in determining success or 
failure of individual education (Ichino, Rustichini, Checchi, 1997): 
the human capital in the Mezzogiorno is strongly distributed 
according the income distribution and the social position. 
Moreover, this correlation has been confirmed over the past 40 
years (Goffredo, 1995). Among others, Papagni (2001) argues that, 
in presence of an imperfect credit market, the income distribution 
determines the amount of resources devoted to education. The 
credit system in the Southern regions is thus responsible for the 
scarce support given to households during the human capital 
accumulation phase.  
 
In general, barriers to entry in some professional activities 
influence the employment allocation of human resources and 
reduce the effectiveness of education as instrument of social 
improvement (Fabbri and Rossi, 1997). Finally, the analysis carried 
out by Checchi (2001) shows how the convergence in terms of 
education levels has not been able to significantly engrave on 
Individual earnings. This is perhaps due to the low social mobility 
which characterises the Southern society.  
                                                 
29 See also Gattei (1995). 
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4.2.2 Factors which determine the human capital demand: 
complementarities between market and education 
The precedent approach seems to exclude that an insufficient 
accumulation of human capital could depend by a productive 
structure unable to exploit the available human resources. 
Consequently, the proposed intervention policy should limit to 
remove barriers to education by guaranteeing a more efficient 
education system. This approach can be partly misleading with 
regards to the Mezzogiorno. As we have previously mentioned, not 
only the Southern economy is characterised by an inelastic demand 
for some kind of human capital but, it also complains the lack of 
skilled labour. Besides, labour demand in the Mezzogiorno may 
require low skilled people, due to the low quality of the industrial 
structure.  
 
According to a second approach, a policy should thus work to 
increase the complementarities between educational choice and 
productive activities (Carillo, 2001). More crucially for the 
Mezzogiorno development, Graziani (2001) concludes that, 
education and human capital accumulation can yield the expected 
effect only if the are matched with productive investment in high 
tech sectors. Otherwise, it will be difficult for the Southern regions 
to keep the skilled labour force and stimulate further investment in 
human capital. The empirical evidence reported by Jahnke (2001) 
confirms that the massive brain drain from South to North has not 
been compensated neither in minimum part, by a reverse brain 
exchange. The analysis carried out on the inter universities mobility 
over the period 1989-1998 (Goffredo, 1995, Jahnke, 2001) 
confirms the strong attractiveness of Centre-North universities for 
southern students.    
4.3 Human Capital as development factor in the 
Mezzogiorno: Conclusions 
The accumulation of human capital is a complex process involving 
economic, cultural, social and institutional factors. The common 
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view largely identifies the origin of the Southern 
underdevelopment  in the inefficiency of local and national 
institutions as well as social practices, which keep the Southern 
society and economy in a general underemployment equilibrium of 
material, natural and human resources, by making of rent-seeking 
the most profitable activities. All these factors still restrain in the 
Mezzogiorno the accumulation of human capital by pushing it 
towards inefficient allocations. As inevitable consequence, 
unproductive sectors have been excessively grown.  
 
The empirical evidence does not offer unambiguous confirmation 
that human capital is correlated to economic growth in the 
Southern regions. In general, this correlation might not be found 
because education attainment, which is used in most of the 
empirical works reviewed earlier, may not be the right explanatory 
variable.  Education attainment does not take into account skills 
and competence, which are the results of learning processes and 
which are more likely to have a positive influence on economic 
growth. With this respect, the empirical results show that 
unemployment and allocation effects could have a crucial role in 
the accumulation of human capital and, in turn, that labour market 
functioning is crucial to define the effectiveness of future policies 
aimed to foster the long run growth of the Italian Southern 
regions.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The present collection of empirical contributes, far from being 
exhaustive, has tried to provide an useful background for the 
evaluation of old and new development policies. As regards the 
extraordinary intervention policy, the empirical evidence reported 
in section 2 confirms the existence of two different phases: while 
financial incentives and investment in Infrastructure have been 
successful in increasing productivity in the Mezzogiorno over the 
period 1957-76, after the oil shock, the industrialisation policy has 
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dramatically slackened in favour of a larger use of public spending 
mainly devoted to support employment levels and household 
income. This change in strategy together with the corresponding 
waste of resources, has contributed not only to a general loss of 
effectiveness of development policy, but also to feed unproductive 
sectors and inefficient institutions. Since 1992, the policy for the 
Southern regions has been overhauled. After a period of centrally 
administrated regional policies, the new development programme 
for the Mezzogiorno, defined within the European regional policy 
framework, has been steered at increasing the territorial 
competitiveness and the attraction of the international capitals, 
progressively mobile in the Southern area, by privileging the 
interventions in the field of infrastructures, of human capital and 
of the research and development, pressing for integrated 
interventions of local development, introducing the priorities of 
environment and of equal opportunities. Though it is too early to 
attempt a comprehensive empirical evaluation of the effectiveness 
of this strategy and its instruments, the few existing empirical 
contributes highlight that, the success of this strategy must involve 
a general process of reform and modernisation of the public 
administration capable to increase productivity and private 
investment.  
  
In order to provide a more detailed picture of the impact of 
development policies, future researches will enlarge empirical 
analysis to other relevant aspects of the Southern economy such as 
consumption and labour market.  
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Appendix 1. The Negotiation planning: a descriptive summary of main normative reference 
 
Normative references Rationale and contents 
“Ordinary intervention  regulation for 
depressed areas”  
(Law 488/92) 
This regulation promotes investment carried out by firms located in all depressed areas. The 
eligible investment are those related to (i) new productive facilities, (ii) extension, and 
restructuring works of a plant, (ii) plant transfer to a new location. A new mechanism of 
applications’ selection is introduced. The aim of these instruments is to favour those 
entrepreneurs who invest an amount of their own private resources higher than the value of 
investment.  
 
“Urgent measures of public finance 
rationalisation” 
(Law 662/96 art. 2, commas 203-209) 
 
“Regulation of negotiation planning” 
(CIPE Deliberation 21/3/97) 
The main element is the agreement among several public and private social parts (the so called 
“concertazione”). The objective is to stimulate the development of network and agglomeration 
externalities in the Southern regions, in order to favour (i) firms agglomerations, (ii) relations 
based on trust, (iii) knowledge exchange and public administration efficiency. The final 
objective is to increase the productivity, employment and welfare levels in the Southern 
regions.  Though this planning method is extended to all the national territory, the public 
funds are reserved to depressed areas. Special instruments of negotiation planning are: 
 
1. Institutional planning agreements (Intese istituzionali di programma). The Government and the 
regions together detect the objectives and define the sectors in which an institutional initiative 
is needed.  
 
2. Planning framework agreements (Accordi di Programma Quadro). Local authorities, public and 
private entities define a mutual interest plan. The formal agreement defines the activities and 
the interventions to be carried out, along with the ways and the schedule of accomplishment; 
moreover, the agreement identifies  a person in charge of the carrying out of each activity and 
the responsible agents for monitoring. 
(Law 64/86) 
3. Planning Contracts (Contratti di Programma). The state and firms design a contract to realise 
new plants and to create additional employment with positive and significant effects on both 
the local and the national economic system. This instrument is exclusive to depressed areas.  
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Appendix 1. The Negotiation planning: a descriptive summary of main normative reference 
(cont.) 
 
Normative references Rationale and contents 
(Law 341/95) 
4. Territorial Pacts (Patti Territoriali). Local authorities, public and private entities, local firms, 
define an intervention planning to promote a local development process. These pacts are 
funded by means of local, regional as well as state resources and the share of private resources 
in the company activities cannot be below the 30%. 
(Law 662/96) 
5. Area Contracts (Contratti d’area). These instruments are used to promote new company 
activities and create employment in sectors such as tourism, industry, services and agro-
industry. They can be promoted by trade unions and employers in areas featuring very low 
employment rates.  
Fiscal acts to promote the balanced 
development: the tax credit  
(Law 388/2000, financial act,  2001) 
Firm owners located in depressed areas of the Southern regions can take advantage of tax 
credit (“credito d’imposta”). These tax reliefs refer to: (i) Investments undertaken to buy new 
material and immaterial instrumental goods assigned to productive structures located in 
depressed areas. Such a credit can be used as offset for direct tax payments, (ii) New open 
ended (employment) contracts; moreover, the law contains provisions in favour of “territorial 
continuity” for Sardinia and Sicilian minor isles: the aim is to reduce the incidence of transport 
costs on finished and semi-finished products exported by the region. 
“Proxy to the Government for 
infrastructure and strategic productive 
settlings” 
(Law 443/2001) 
In order to reduce the gap among several Italian areas in terms of infrastructure, this law 
provides for public works planning for the development of the Country. The protection of the 
environment is explicitly taken into account. In particular, against drought and desertification, 
the law provides interventions linked to (i) water recovery, (ii) management of water supply, 
and (iii) water recycling for agriculture.  
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Tab.1 The role of Infrastructures: : an overview of empirical literature 
  
Sources Period Sample Approach Explanatory variables  Results 
Real government spending for 
Infrastructure investment 
Positive and Significant 
Index of Infrastructures capital  Positive but not significant 
Acconcia, Del Monte 
(2000) 1963-93 Regions Panel Data 
Endowment of building 
infrastructures 
Not Significant 
La Ferrara, Marcellino 
(2000) 1970-94 Regions Panel Data 
Real government spending for 
Infrastructure investment Positive and Significant 
Paci, Pigliaru (1995) 1970-89 Regions Cross Sections Endowment of Infrastructures Positive and Significant 
Endowment of Economic 
Infrastructures Positive and Significant Paci, Saddi (2002) 1970-95 Regions Panel Data 
Housing Infrastructures Negative and Significant 
Index of core infrastructures  Positive and Significant 
Picci (1999) 1970-95 Regions Panel Data Index of non-core 
Infrastructures Negative and Significant 
Endowment of transport 
Infrastructures 
Positive and Significant (especially 
for the South) Viviani, Vulpes (1999) 1987 Regions Panel Data 
Endowment of SER 
Infrastructures 
Positive and Significant (especially 
for the South) 
Notes 
Core Infrastructures: Roads, airports, railroads, subways, ports, energy, water, telecommunications 
Non-core Infrastructures: Hospital, Public buildings, others not elsewhere included 
SER: Infrastructures in Sanitation, Energy, Reclamation 
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Tab.2 The role of Education in Italian regional growth: an overview of empirical literature 
 
Sources Period Sample Approach Explanatory variables for HK Results 
Average years of total schooling 
of the active population 
Positive and significant when 
controlling for the extension of the 
public sector Di Liberto (2001) 1963-94 Regions Panel Data 
Tertiary education Negative and significant 
Total years of schooling for 
different education levels 
allocated to the public sector 
Negative and significant 
Total years of Schooling in 
Tertiary education 
Positive and significant when 
controlling for the public sector Lodde (2000) 1971-91 Regions 
Pooled Cross 
Section 
Average values of the total years 
of education (for different 
education levels)  
Positive and significant when 
controlling for the catching up 
effect 
Students enrolled in non productive  
studies Negative and Significant Maiolo (2001) 1951-93 Macro Area Time Series Students enrolled in  productive 
studies 
Positive and Significant 
Notes 
Primary education: 5 years of primary level + 3 years of lower secondary education (scuola elementare + scuola media) 
Secondary education: 5 years of upper secondary education (istituto superiore) 
Tertiary education: university and post university degrees 
The catching up effect is measured by the ratio between the GDP per worker of the leading region and that of the region into consideration 
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Tab.2 The role of Education in Italian regional growth: an overview of empirical literature 
(cont.) 
 
Sources Period Sample Approach Explanatory variables for HK Results 
Mauro, Carmeci 
(2002) 
Mauro (2003) 
1963-95 Regions Cross sections Panel Data High school enrolment rate 
Positive and significant when 
controlling for the unemployment 
rate dimension 
Mauro, Podrecca 
(1994) 
1963-89 Regions Cross Section High school enrolment rate Ambiguous 
Paci, Pigliaru (1995) 1970-89 Regions Cross Section High school enrolment rate 
High school diploma and laurea 
Negative and not significant 
Total years of schooling 
Total  years of non mandatory 
education  
Not Significant 
Average years of schooling 
Coppola, De Blasio, 
Gallo (1998) 1961-91 Regions Cross Section 
Average years of non mandatory 
education 
Positive and Significant 
Piras (1996) 1970-92 Regions Cross Section Share of population above 6 with 
different education levels 
Positive and Significant 
Goria, Ichino (1994) 1962-89 Regions Cross Section 
Panel Data 
Total years of schooling Ambiguous 
 
